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1- THE THIRD WORLD IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY 
1. That rather abstract and misleading term «The Third World», or 
the equally unsatisfactory and nearly synonymous phrase, «underdeve-
loped countries», still assumes a fairly concrete meaning within the con-
ceptual framework of Soviet foreign policy. For Lenin and his generation 
of Soviet leaders, the colonial and semicolonial dependencies of the West 
appeared to be the crucial future battIegrounds of the struggle between 
the worlds of socialism and capitalismo 
At the 1920 Conference of the Comintern, Lenin spoke eloquently 
about the connection between the revolutionary struggle of the working 
class and the situation of oppressed colonial peoples. 
To him, national liberation of the colonial peoples was a two stage 
process - the first stage of rapprochement involves the victims of colonia-
lism in the beginnings of their national liberation struggleagainst their 
oppressors who are, by definition, capitalist imperialismo 
There are those who argue that ideology is dead, and that MOSCOW 
is merely interested in maintaining and advancing the national interest of 
the Russian State, developing the theory of «correlation of forces» instead 
of «balance of powers». Anything that happens anywhere in the world 
affects the correlation in some way, and everything is systematically 
conneated with everything else. 
That theory of correlation of forces provided a conceptually flexible 
tool enabling its practitioners to define, pursue, and rationalise their policies, 
(*) Trablaho apresentado no NATO Symposium, realizado em Maio de 1987, em Roma, 
sob a responsabilidade do NATO Defense College e US National Defense University, sob 
o tema: «East·West Relations Three Years After Gorbachev's Acession to Power: Implications 
for NATO». 
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simultaneously, at the complementary leveIs of ideology and power politics. 
Soviet policy in Africa and Asia followed that conciliatory paUern between 
the Soviet national interest and the requirements of revolutionary theory. 
2. In «Patterns of Soviet Third World Policy», Francis Fukuyama 
(1) expressed a very interesting analysis of Soviet Foreign policy in the 
Third World since the Bolsheviks carne to power in 1917. That policy 
has been an alternation between what have come to be known as «left-
-wing» and «right-wing» strategies. 
Table 1: Ten Periods 
of Soviet Third World Policy 
Dates Orientation Characterization 
1. 1917 -1921 left War Communism 
2. 1921-1928 right New Economic Policy (NEP) 
3. 1928 -1935 left «Third Period» 
4. 1935 - 1939 right Popular Front 
5. 1939 - 1941 left Nazi-Soviet Pact 
6. 1941-1947 right Wartime alliance 
7. 1947 -1952 left Zhdanovshchina 
8. 1954 - 1964 right Khrushchev's opening to 
«bourgeois nationalists» 
8a. 1964-1972 right Moribund Khrushchevism 
9. 1973 - 1982 left Support for Marxist-Leninist 
vanguard parties 
10. 1982- right Andropov-Gorbachev policy 
Source: «Patterns of Soviet Third World Policy», F. Fukuyama (2). 
The distinction between left and right revolves around the issue of the 
appropriate choice of allies in the West for communist power or Soviet 
influence. In left-wing periods, communist parties have tented to avoid 
alliances of any sort, concentrating instead on maintaining their internaI 
orthodoxy and discipline. Right-wing periods, by contrast, have been ones 
of broad alliance between communist parties and other sympathetic non-
communist groups. In the case of the colonial Third World, these have 
been local «bourgeois» nationalists, national liberation movements, and 
other «anti-imperialist» groups. 
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II - THE COMPETING COMMUNISMS IN THE THIRD WORLD 
1. The ideological objective of spreading communism in the Third 
World became, after 1949, a very difficult area of understanding between 
the two great motherlands of revolution: Soviet Union and China. Soviet 
Union's approach to the socialist revolution was more oriented to the role 
of the political «elites», the class struggle, and the polítical fight developed 
by the local communist parties. The Bolshevik prototype gave support to 
this approach, since the instruments of success has been the social class 
struggle, the movements of people masses in towns, the political urbanism 
in huge rallies, and the role of the Red Army. On the other side, the success 
of the Chinese Revolution was much more attained in the fields, the 
concept of the People's War, with the use of guerrilla techniques, and the 
support of the people to the fighting arm of the r'evolution. 
The controversies between the Soviet Union and China on the issue 
of how, when, where, and under what circunstances communist countries 
should support revolutionary movements had too strong an importance 
during the 50's and the 60's. The Chinese accused the Soviets of having 
abandoned the cause of revolution and of preaching the following false 
doctrines: (1) Imperialism can be overthrown peacefully, without violence. 
(2) War is so terrible, and in the nuclear age so dangerous, that it must 
be avoided at all costs. By contrast, the Chinese said that their views were 
the following: 
Revolutions cannot be carried out by peaceful means, but only 
through violence, through «people's wars», «national liberation wars» , 
«revolutionary wars». (2) Such wars do not inevitably escalate into nuclear 
wars. Revolutionary wars, therefoDe, must not be feared, for otherwise 
the peoples of the underveloped countries would be doomed to perpetuaI 
slaV'ery. If the imperialists or «social-imperialists» (i. e. the Soviets) unleashed 
wars, this would bring revolutions, but if the people overthrew imperialism, 
there would be more wars. As Maoexpressed it, «with regard to the ques-
tion of world war, there are but two possibilities: one is that war will give 
rise to revolution and the other is that revolution will prevent wan). 
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2. It will be irrelevant to explore and relate the history of the last 
three decades of international infhrence in important areas of the Third 
World. The actors have been the United States, China, Europe, and the 
Soviet Union, and new ones are coming. The interests have been quite 
different, but have moved abrupt1y from ideology to economic and military 
influence. Thre doctrines comprised of several factors like the spread of 
socialist revolution, elevating peoples to human leveIs, democracy building, 
and containment of communist influence. Toe instruments were different 
ranging from recruiting and training cadres to economic aid. 
The objects, and the suffering ones, had been the peoples of those 
region~, where war, different every day, continues to produce pain, death, 
famine and very difficuIt times. The definition of a model matrix, in order 
to study the actual situation, is a difficult task, but, in order to avoid it, 
let us advance some postulates which will make more understandable the 
actual military aparatus of the Soviei Union in such distant areas as CUBA 
Of ANGOLA. 
First Postulate 
The competing interests of the Soviet Union and China in expanding 
communism have been evident in areas like ASIA, LATIN AMERICA, 
and AFRICA. China's support to liberation movements, in Asia and in 
Africa, was much more evident and successful than that of the Soviet 
Union, which insisted in the ro}e of some elites and the influence of the 
Communist Parties in the European colonial powers. China developed rela-
tions with liberation movemenis such as ZANU (RHODESIA), SW APO 
(NAMtBIA), FRELIMO (MOZAMBIQUE), FLNA and UNITA (AN-
GOLA) surpassing the Soviet Union in the ammount of assistance given 
to African States. In 1974 Chinese 3id totaled, in US dollars, $237 million, 
while the Soviets provided only $17 million. In fact, the Chinese had 
outdistanced the Soviets in terms of total aid to Africa ovef the previous 
20 years, and had concentrated their largesse in the southern half of the 
continent. Chinese aid to T ANZANIA, ZAMBIA, ZAIRE and even 
CONGO far exceeded that provided by the Soviets. 
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Second Postulate 
Fidel Castro and Che Guevara weve two dilferent appr0'aches to the 
spread of communism in Latin America. The Che Guevara theory of «armed 
focus», theorized by Regis Debray, faHed while the Cuban experience, and 
the role of strong communist parties succeded and almost added Chile to 
the Soviet Union sphere of influence. In the Cuban experience, the moilitary 
aid provided by the Soviet U nion was as decisive a factor in the initial 
success as the Security Services and Intelligence were decisive in conso-
lidating poHtical power, and spreading influence in all the countries of 
Central America t0' this day. It is my perception that Latin America will 
be an area of insecurity, where competing interests of the Soviet Union 
and tire United States have to look carefully at the diverse players: the 
political process of democracy, the very unstable social fabric, the Catholic 
Church, and the public opinion. How to make one's neighbours safe 0'r 
h0'w to influence them from a distance is the' real question betwee.n the 
United States and the Soviet Union, given the small influence of China 
in the area. MEXICO, BRASIL, ARGENTINA, PERU and VENEZUELA 
are great players which will have a very important role in the future. 
Third Postulate 
ASIA has been a «though nut to crack» for the Soviet Union, and 
is becoming more so. Soviet policy has to accommodate to Asia's size, to 
its four different main subregions, and to the other global actors in the 
area: CHINA, the UNITED STATES and JAPAN. It is perceived 
that the foreign policy of the Soviet Union in the area has been 
more defensive than offensive, and oriented to containing difficult neighbours 
more than to spreading influence. Afghanistan, not finished yet, it a very 
good example of the flexible aproach in the ar,ea. 
F ourth Postulate 
Since the Fudamentalist Revolution in Iran, Islam overlaps Socialism 
in some areas of the globe, and is followed by regional conflits declared 
in the Middle East and potential 'Ünes in North Africa. The Soviet Union 
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is following the problem of Islam and the Middle East very carefully, not 
only for internaI reasons and the upheaval of the Muslim minorities within 
its borders, but for externaI reasons too, given the military buid-up in the 
area, and the danger of escalation üf the conflict either horizontally or 
vertically. 
Fifth Postulate 
For much of the postwar era, arms transfers have been a crucial part 
of Soviet relations with the Third Würld. This emphasis ün military aid 
is estimated as 120.6 billion US dollars between 1974 and 1986 (SYRIA, 
IRAQ, LIBA, VIETNAM, INDIA, ALGERIA, CUBA, ETHIOPIA and 
ANGOLA received almost 80 % of the total deliveries). Although the 
Soviet Union has tried tO' establish dose ties with the developing countries 
through a variety of nonmilitary means (inc1uding economic assistance, 
trade, educational exchanges, and polítical cooperation), it has been unable 
to sustain its economic aid at more than token leveIs in recent years, 
and has l'Ost nearly all üf its appeal as a model für developm·ent. Conse-
quently, arms transfers have become the primary instrument that enables 
the Soviet Union tO' compeVe with Western countries and China for influence 
in Third World. In the 1980's military exports have also been a key süurce 
of hard currency, although problems have begun to arise für the Soviet 
Uni'On in this lucrative trade because of the growing financia'! contraints 
that many üf its Third W orld customers are experiencing. 
III-RECENT SOVIET ACTIONS IN THE THIRD WORLD 
1. The Soviet Union's pülicy in the Third World has produced both 
successes and failures. What can we, in conc1usion, say of Soviet efforts 
in the Third World? Have they been more or less successful? Dües the 
answer to this question depend upon region? Can we identify success with 
prüximity tO' the Soviet U nion, cultural environment, type of instruments 
used, or degree of commitment made by Müscow? What have been the 
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important instrum,ents of Soviet policy in the Third World? Antecedent to 
alI of these questions, of course, is the fundamental question: 
What are the Soviet objectives in the Third World? 
Although varying in the four main regions of the Third W orld consi-
dered (Latin America, Africa, The Middle East and Asia), some or all of 
the following objectives seem to apply in most Soviet Third World activities: 
- to gain control over raw materiaIs vital to Westem economies; 
- to demonstrate support for left-wing regimes; 
- t'O «capture» Third World States for the Communist Bloc; 
- to keep Chinese influence out of the Third World; 
- to gain strategic advantage, through the acquisition of military 
facilities that might be useful in war; 
- to acquire footholds for use in peace as a means of extending 
influenoe.; 
- to divert the attention of Western powers away from Soviet borders; 
- to obtain use fuI economic concessions, as in fishing rights. 
lhis list has looked much the same since the death of Stalin, but very 
few of these objectives began to be realised until the latter part of the 1960's. 
What has made their realization possible has been the growth of the 
military component of Soviet power, which began in those years when, after 
the Cuban crisis, the Soviet Union realized its low capacity to project power 
from a distance. Almost simultaneously, the S'Oviet Union also began to 
realize that, in competition with the West, the other instruments of 
influence - political, cultural, diplomatic and econ'Omic - were not those 
which she could wi,eld with any great success. Only the military instruments 
remained, and this has been refined over the past decade to the point where 
it is responsive and subtle in application whether through the supply of 
arms, through supportive military activity or through direct military inter-
.~~ ',': vention in many different guises. ln the early 1960's, the Soviet Union 
lacked an ocean-g'Oing navy, sea-based air power, long range transport 
aircraft and amphibious shipping. She could not m'aintain a fleet at sea 
and had few friendly ports of call. Even her marchant marine was small 
and lacked the kind of heavy-lift equipment needed t'O off-Ioad carg'O like 
tanks in countries with minimal dock facilities. She had no specialised 
ro'll-onjroll-'Off shipping for rapid disembarkation of vehicles. 
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By the end of the 1970's, a11 but one of these disadvantages had been 
corrected. The one that still remains is the lack of sea-based airpower, but 
the Soviet U nion has gone way to make up for the lack of reconnaissance 
at sea by the extensive deployment of land-based maritime patrol aircrafts 
and maritime reconnaissance sate11ites. 
2. Since the late 1970's the Soviet Union has been the largest supplier 
of military equipment and services to the Third W orld, having dislodged 
the United States from the top position: for the period from' 1981 through 
1985 Soviet arms transfers accounted, in value terms, for 33 percent of 
a11 weapons exported to the Third World, compared to only 19 percent 
supplied by the United States. 
Soviet Military deliveries to noncomunist Third World States during 
this seven-year period were worth nearly four times as much as the Soviet 
arms supplíed during the 20 years from 1955 through 1974. Even if, as 
some estimates suggest, Soviet arms shipments to most regions have leveled 
off or declined since the early 1980's, as a result of the reduced demand 
for weapons among indebted Third World states, both the quantity and the 
quaJity of arms supplied by the USSR remain at very high leveIs. 
From 1954 through 1981, approximately two-thirds of total Soviet arms 
shipments went to countries in the Middle East and South Asia, the remain-
der going largely to East Asian states, primarily Vietnam, North Korea, 
and (before 1960) China. 
Over the past decade, the share of total Soviet arms shipments going 
to the Middlc East anard Southern Afr:ca has become even more dispropor-
tionate, rising to 74 percent. The non communist Third World countries 
that received the largest amounts of Soviet weapons are alI ~ocated in the 
Middle East and South Asia, with Syria. Iraq and Lybia actua11y surpassing 
communist states such as Vietnam and Cuba in the value of military equip-
ment received from the Soviet Union. 
The Soviets continue to demonstrate a great appreciation for the ability 
of arms transfers to serve as a lever in gaining polítical influence. Moscow 
continues providing large ammounts of military equipment and material 
to strategically located lesser developed countries on an outright grant basis. 
(Table 2) 
During the last five years over 400/0 or an averag,e 6 or 7 billion US 
doI per year, of the Soviet arms deliveries to the Third World were made 
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on a grant basis. In fact, the Soviets allocated over $3 billion a year in 
outright military grants to onIy five countries (CUBA, VIETNAM, NICA-
RAGUA, ANGOLA and SYRIA). 
Even the minor recipients of Soviet arms receive approximateIy 30 to 
45 percent of their arms on a grant basis. 
In addition to this grant aid the Soviets are providing other financiaI 
concessions, inc1uding offering credit at concessionary rates, accepting 
payment in soft currency or in commodity shipments, and rescheduiJ.ing or 
f.orgiving Iong-term debts. 
Soviet arms transfers have aIso provided a means for gaining basing 
rights abroad, as well as an entry for Soviet advisors to the receiving country. 
For exempIe, Soviet invoIvment in Sub-Saharan Africa remains high. 
In Ethiopia there are approximately 1,700 military advisors. Likewise, in 
Mozambique about 850 Soviet militaI-Y advisors train Mozambique's Armed 
Forces. In Angola, the presence of 45.000 Cuban military surrogates 
augments direct Soviet support which in 1987 consisted of deliveries of addi-
tional FLOGGER fighter aircraft, HIP H helicopters, SA-2 and SA-8 surface-
-to-air missiles (SAMS), and numerous tanks, artillery pieces and BMP 
airmoved vehicles. 
3. As a result of this policy of arms transfer and military aid, the 
Soviet Union, either directly or indirectly by surrogates, specially 
Cubans, porjected power to important areas of the Third World. This 
projection of power began in the eady of the cold war, and has not finished 
up to now, being an important and decisive factor in some important con-
flicts in the last decades. After some failures and inconclusive actions, the 
Soviet Union, especially at the time when Portugal finished what European 
misperceptions called, regretfully, the «last empire» made an important 
change of methods in supporting marxist régimes in Southem Africa and 
Latin America. The supportive action of playe'rs dealing with low intensity 
conflicts gave place to extraordinary build-up of conventional forces that 
had unbalanced the military power in such countries as ANGOLA, MO-
ZAMBIQUE, ETHIOPIA, NICARAGUA and AFGANHISTAN. 
For exemple, and this is very important, after the independence of 
ANGOLA and MOZAMBIQUE, in 1974-75, where no battle tank, APC 
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or significant air defense systems exhisted at the time, the actual picture 
of sophisticated weapons systems and equipment that is challenging regional 
securit\y is the following: 
I I I I 
Air Figters I Helicoplers Tanks APC's AA Groun 
Attackers 
175 - T34 200-BRDM ZU - 23 - 2 40- MIG 23 Mi-24 
150 - T54 150 - BTR 
ANGOLA 
ZPU 14,5 35 - Mi 8 
120 - T62 100/150 - BTRGO SA- 3/6/7 / 25 - MIG 17 
/8/9/14 
50-PT -76 40-MIG21 
300- T34 150 - BRDM ZU -23 
MOZAM-
300 - BTR-60 SU - 23.4 SP 7 - Mi 8 S 54/SS 35 - MIG 19/ 
BIQUE /21 
I 42-PT -76 SA 3/7 24-MIG 17 
SOURCE: «World Defense Almanac Military Techonology», 1987-88 
The deliveries of these weapons and equipments began in 1975/76, but 
the majority of them occured after 1983. The military inbalance produced 
in Southern Africa results froro simple facts: 
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(1) The actual Angola Air Force is the second largest in Africa, con-
sisting of 40 Mig-21 Fishbed, 40 Mig-23 Flogger and a smaller, 
but undisc10sed number of Su-22 figther aircraft. The Mig-21 's 
are flown by Soviet trained AngoIan piIots, while Mig-23's and 
SU-22's are thought to be flown by Cuban and a smaller number 
of East Gennan and/or soviet pilots. 
(2) After the raids by the South Africa Air Force, a very complete 
and sophisticated Soviet supplied air defense system is being installed. 
Over 75 mobile radar sets, of seven different types, based on 
23 sites, form the basis of a comprehensive command and controI 
network. 
The fighting arm of this consists of three types of jet fjghters, six 
anti-aircraft (AA) missile systems and four calibres of anti-aircraft 
guns. In addition, fieid units are reported to employ three forms 
of shoulder-launched missile weapons. 
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The radar network apparently consists of eight sector operations 
centres, and 15 control and reporting centres. (Chart 2-Annex). 
Mobile AA missile systems operational in Angola are the SA-2 
Guideline, SA-3 Goa, SA-6 Gainful, SA-8 series B Gecko, SA-9 
Gaskin and SA-13 Gopher. 
AA guns include the 14.5 mm KPV on various mountings, 23 mm 
ZSU twin-barre1 wheeled and ZSU-23-4 quadruple barreI tracked, 
37 mm M 1939 and 57 mm 5-60. Portable shoulder-launched AA 
missiles consist óf the SA-7 Grail and SA-14 Gremlin. There is also 
a report of a Soviet riva'l to the Stinger, designated S-16, baing 
used. 
IV - PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS 
1. By the early 1980's, there was a general recognition, in the Soviet 
theorical literature, that earlier hopes for strong clients, and lasting 
influence resulting from the promotion of Marxist-Leninist vanguard party-
-states were not being realized. Though the new generation of Marxist-
-Leninist allies willingly cooperated with Moscow, both politically and mili-
tary, they themselves were not doing well. They tended to be economically 
backward, even by Third W orld standards, and this condition was ma de 
worse by the premature introduction of such socialist «measures» as collec-
tivization of agriculture and whdlesale nationalization of foreign property. 
Due to their small domestic political base and ideologicaI narrowness, many 
ot these regimes were perceived as illegitimate by a sizeabIe segment ot 
their own popuIation. Several, including those in ANGOLA, MOZAMBI-
QUE, AFGHANISTAN, CAMBODIA and NICARAGUA, faced internaI 
guerrilla insurgencies. 
Rather than having the need for Soviet military and economic assis-
tance taper off when Marxist-Leninist regimes carne to power, in many 
cases, the need for assistance grew substantially over time, to the point of 
making the Soviet Third World «empire» a considerable drain on Soviet 
resources. It is also noticed that the role of ideOllogy in defining Soviet 
foreign poIicy objectives, and in providing politicaI instruments for expan-
sion has been steadily declining in the postwar period. The canges aIread'Y 
brought about by Gorbachev have further acceIerated that decline. 
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Whatever the real-world implications of the «new politieal thinking», 
the old ideological language of Marxism-Leninism and vanguard parties 
is now seldom heard. Moseow no longer has at its disposal a world com-
munist movement through which it can work, and to which it can give 
orders, because international communism has not recovered, and is unlikely 
to recover, from the splits with Yugoslavia in the 1940's and with China 
in the 1950's and 1960's. 
2. Searching for new ways and approaches for a «real-politik» of a 
superpower, the Soviet Union is moving in a right-wing period of its foreign 
poliey. The «Gorbachev doctrine» needs to spent much more intemally 
than abroad, to expand influence for some people in the Politburo, and 
the new International Department will be worth much more if it is oriented 
toward capitalist-oriented countries like INDIA, MEXICO, ARGENTINA 
and BRAZIL. 
Contrary to the Khushchev docrine that «believed in a one-generation 
tTansformation from national liberation to socialism», the Kremlin is rever-
t!ng to orthodox Marxi~m, which says that countries must go through a 
capitalist phase before they can achieve communism. 
As Gorbachev said recentIy, «We favour socialism, but we do not 
impose our convictions on anyone. Let everyone choose for himself, and 
will evenltual1y put everything in its place». 
Realistically the West has to understand that where the Kremlin has 
longstanding commitments, as in Cuba and Vietnam, its promises are kept, 
although Moscow is eager to cease the burden. In other more promising 
are as, the Kremlin is using shrewd diplomatic and trade tacties to gain 
leverage. It threatens to undercut U. S. influence by playing both sides 
in the Iran-Iraq war, by making up with China, and by offering to help 
mediate the Palestinian problem. But nowhere is Moscow lauching any new 
military adventures, and it is trying to get out of some old ones. The 
withdrawl from Afghanistan is a Soviet defeat, and the peace agreement 
still could be a disaster for Moscow if the pro-Soviet Afghan government 
is quickly overhelmed by the Islamic rebels who refuse to stop fighting. 
In China, the Middle East, and the GU'lf, Moscow will try to expand 
its influence at Washington expense. In other areas, the United States might 
be able to rearrange the balance of power in its own favor by cutting 
deals with Cuba, Nicaragua and Vietnam. 
44 
SOVIET ACTIONS IN THE THIRD WORLD 
Soviet-supplied air defence systems in Angola 
ANGOLA 
• LUENA 
• HUAMBO 
MA~ALA • JA"IBA • "1Er\ONGUE 
LUBANGO 
• TCHAMUTETE 
CARACULO 
0:A\ITBE • VIREI • MULONDO 
TOMBUA • CHIBEMBA 
CAHAMA 
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Marxist Mozambique may already receive more aid from the West 
than from the Soviet Union, and it isn't clear whether Moscow is ready 
to write off Angola where, for 12 years now, Westem baked rebels have 
stood off the Marxist government and 45.000 Cuban troops and advisors. 
US officials say that the Soviets are not cooperating with Washington'~ 
efforts to negotiate a settlement, in part because Angola's oii fields still 
eam hard currency. 
Does Gorbachev mean what he says about wanting peaceful solutions? 
A quick way to find out be to challenge him, once again, to help with 
negotiated settlements in Angola or the Iran-Iraq war. Even if Gorbachev 
keeps his side of the bargain, détente will not necessarily be at hand. 
The Soviet 'leader still means to compete for global influence. If he 
fails in his attempt to promote «new thinking» at home and abroad, Gor-
bachev probably will be replaced, according some Kremlinologists. 
11 th May, 1988 
G. A. do Espírito Santo 
MG-PO Army 
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